UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
CASE NO. 21-MD-03015-AHS


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(Appearances continued)
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    OB
    THEODORE H. FRANK:
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(Call to the Order of the Court.)
THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon, everyone. And good morning to my west coast people that may be signed on here.

We're here for our MDL hearing in Case 21-03015; it is regarding Johnson \& Johnson Aerosol Sunscreen Marketing Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation.

We've got a number of you that are here, that I'm sure are going to be speaking here today. Before we start, I just do have to issue this blanket warning. You know, we're in strange times, in terms of security and things like that, so there can be no recording at all, whether it's from lawyers or civilians. I will tell you, the marshals are really good monitoring our Zoom, and they're very quick to show up at people's doors, and it's pretty shocking for them to have that visit. So I just have to lay that out there before every big Zoom hearing because it is the way we live now.

That having been said, let me start off by getting appearances for plaintiffs' side first, and then we'll go to defense side. Then I'll get a formal appearance, as well, from our one filed objector, who $I$ see in the top right of my screen. So let's start then with plaintiffs' counsel first.

MS. GROMBACHER: Good afternoon, your Honor. Kiley Grombacher, of Bradley/Grombacher, one of the class counsel for plaintiffs this morning.

THE COURT: And listen, nice to see all of you, so I'm not going to say that individually to each of you when you announce your appearance.

MR. AYLSTOCK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Bryan Aylstock, and my partner, Jason Richards, also for the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Of the two of you, whoever decides to speak, if you could just say your name first, only so that my court stenographer can get that down, that would be ideal.

MR. AYLSTOCK: Absolutely, Judge.
MS. WALSH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Alexandra Walsh, of Walsh Law, also for the plaintiffs.

MR. BYRNE: Good afternoon. David Byrne, with Beasley
Allen, for the plaintiff class.
MR. DRAVILLAS: Alex Dravillas for the plaintiffs.
THE COURT: Mr. Rumberger, you're on mute.
MR. RUMBERGER: Thank you, Your Honor. Timothy Rumberger, plaintiffs' counsel.

THE COURT: I think that just leaves Mr. Berman, right?
MR. BERMAN: And Mr. Zalesin.
MR. ZALESIN: Your Honor, Steven Zalesin for Johnson \& Johnson Consumer, Inc. And Mr. Berman, as well, for the defendant, JJCI.

THE COURT: Great. All right.
Any other counsel for either the plaintiffs or the
defendants?
And then, Mr. Andren, if you want to formally make an appearance. And you're on mute, as well.

MR. ANDREN: Thank you. John Andren on behalf of objector, Theodore H. Frank.

THE COURT: All right, everyone. Good to have you here. We set this hearing, obviously, a while ago.

Just to recap, I don't want to go through each of the 80 plus docket entries. I don't think there's any need to do that. You all are well familiar with the case. I will tell you, and I think you all know, just based on the few hearings that we've had, that I read every word of every page of what you all filed. And so I would like you to know that I've read everything that has come in, including an updated filing that came in probably about 45 minutes ago, which is Docket Entry 91, with an exhibit. It's a declaration, supplemental, of Jason Rabe.

So I'm very well familiar with the case. Basically, we all know that in October, 2021, the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation created this MDL case. At that time, they sent several matters to me from a variety of states. And the litigation generally concerns carcinogenic aerosol suntan lotion. There's a carve-out for personal injury cases, so that's not at all what we're doing here. We're dealing simply with that product.

So what I would like to do then is kind of just really
hear from each of you and get you to have your positions out there. Knowing that I've read everything, obviously, the record's a little bit different in terms of the hearing. I know there are points that you all want to highlight. I do have some specific questions. I think, probably, it's best for me to actually kind of lay that out upfront, even though I'm not trying to alter your presentations. But I think sometimes that helps.

And so maybe if I could start this way: Basically, my understanding of this case and the way it's been presented is that it goes back as far as the litigation part. So May 25th of 2021, there was an action by Valisure. That same date, the Serota plaintiffs went ahead and filed claims.

Now, going forward then to July 14, 2021, we had the recall, and we had some follow-up that occurred. Mr. Zalesin, you can speak to that when the time is right. But I think the timing is significant because the recall and all of that is approximately two months after the complaint was filed, as opposed to recall and then complaints coming in.

Then during the course of time, this MDL was created. And shortly after it was created, the formal notices of settlement came in. We then went through all of the procedures that we would go through in terms of notice and responses and those kinds of things.

Ultimately, in looking at the filings that $I$ have, it seems like there are three baskets of recovery, so to speak. One is the coupon recovery. Two is the recovery that amounts to close to $\$ 10$ million that deals with the actual recovery in amounts about $\$ 29$ each to 300,000 plus people. And three is the value of nonmonetary relief, which has been argued is approximately $\$ 80$ million.

So we have really what appears to be a total of about $\$ 92$ million or some odd in value out there, 80 million of it which is nonmonetary. We have a claim today that amounts to approximately $\$ 2,600,000$ at the top, $2,500,000$ of attorney's fees, 100,000 in costs. We have an objection from the objector that really outlines a lot of the reasons why we do or don't have class actions. It's a very interesting objection, very interesting case.

And just to kind of put it all in a nutshell, this settlement was something that the plaintiffs and defense unusually worked on quickly and quietly, so to speak, in terms of how a lot of our litigation normally goes.

So that's my nutshell in terms of how I see the case.
My narrow issue, though, is how you all see that \$9.8 million recovery, because there's something I saw specifically in the objector's pleading that says you can't give the settling attorneys credit for moneys that were paid prior to the settlement agreement. And so I would like you
all, at some point today, to flesh that out. Because in the objector's papers, it said, as a matter of law. And then it has that line there. And I just -- I would like to learn about that because, frankly, logically, and from a common sense perspective, it makes zero sense to me as someone who's been in the law for 35 years.

So with that background, Ms. Grombacher, do you want to go first?

MS. GROMBACHER: Sure, sure. I mean, I think Your Honor touched on a lot of things when you gave the synopsis. This has been, in a lot of ways, an atypical litigation. Atypical in terms of an MDL. And, in some ways, atypical in terms of a class action. But I think that's actually inert to the class' benefit.

You know, rather than having to wait years for recovery, bearing the risk of litigation, and watching as litigation costs rise and recovery diminishes, what we were able to do here, because of a lot of factors, is secure relief that was meaningful in the three buckets that you laid out. So meaningful, in a monetary way, in terms of extending programs that JJCI had put into motion following the litigation, and building on those in terms of creating this voucher program for products that the evidence in the record overwhelmingly showed did not have the issues that we alleged.

So there was no indication that these products, the
nonaerosol products for which the vouchers are being paid, contained or were contaminated with levels of benzene. But nonetheless, we were able to get a monetary value, and it was a value that hundreds of thousands -- or almost 170,000 claimants thought had value and decided to take advantage of and avail themselves of. And then there was this injunctive component. And so all the purposes of the litigation were effectuated in an efficient way, and in a quick way.

You raised a point about it being a little bit secretive. It wasn't done so purposefully. It was done so because too many cooks in the kitchen spoils the broth. Right? So we've already had a lot of firms, as you know, you've appointed them as class counsel, who were working towards the settlement.

And I think what's notable here is, there were a lot of firms in this litigation, preeminent plaintiffs' firms, that were not part of the settlement counsel, that had opportunities, that were invited to review the settlement, oppose the settlement, preliminary approval, file objections after receiving all the discovery in this case. They saw the data we saw. They saw the documents we saw. They reviewed the depositions that class counsel took. And they chose not to file objections. There is one sole voice in opposition to this settlement.

And I think you noted rightly that the objection that's
filed is more -- it is more an ideology than perhaps relates to this settlement, although, you know, there's relevancy here.

You know, Mr. Frank is a crusader, and he uses the objection as a sword sometimes to move his ideology. And that's not to say that he doesn't assist the Court sometimes, or that we don't agree sometimes with some of his objections. The objection process can work. I don't think, though, in this litigation, it makes sense to amend and deny approval of a settlement that is by all means fair, reasonable, and adequate for the grounds that are raised in the objection.

We spent a lot of time and a lot of paper on those, and I'm happy to move on them more. But I would say that as a preliminary way to address some of the issues that you talk about.

I think what really comes down, if you boil it down, there are some objections about whether the relief is meaningful to the class. I mean, I think whether it's a voucher, whether it's a coupon -- and I'm happy to talk about that -- there is some questions about whether the injunctive component is meaningful. And we put that in our brief. I think we can talk about that. But $I$ think that it's hard to argue with the fact that there are -- there's testing implementation. There are protocols here to ensure that there isn't contamination that occurs. Or that it's caught early and that it doesn't go to market, it doesn't go to the consumers
here. And there is a settlement agreement that binds the defendants to that conduct, to ensuring that they comply with these protocols. And that's meaningful, too.

And so I guess the question really comes down to a fee issue. You know, how much does ride in fees. Because when we're looking at the value of the settlement, which is what you talked about, when we're valuating that, that's important, really, I guess, when you're down to the fee component. Because when you're looking at fair, reasonable and adequate, the question is what are class members getting, and what are they giving out. Right? Here, they had the ability to get 100 cents on the dollar for products that was affected. You know, if they printed out their Amazon usage history, and they sent that to JJCI, they got paid for that. You know, they paid them whatever was in the proof or they paid them, you know, the retail value. And so that -- there's nothing better you can do there. And in terms of the voucher, they're getting value for a product that had they gone to trial, they would likely get nothing for.

So I think if you're looking at all of the components, and you're looking is this fair, reasonable and adequate, well, the value that's going to the class, it's real, and it would be hard to say that they could do any better if they went to trial in this case.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, Ms. Grombacher. When
you said had they gone to trial, certainly, you're talking about the class as a whole. But how hard would it be in your mind for one individual who bought one product that was worth $\$ 10.98$ to find a lawyer to sue Johnson \& Johnson to recover \$10.98?

MS. GROMBACHER: Sure. I mean, with all these cases, the value and the ability to move forward is because of the class action device. Right? No lawyer -- any lawyer who calls, it's just diminishing returns. The fees would outweigh the benefit to the class member.

So, you know, they've got the option of standing alone in small claims court, maybe, or you have the class device, which is the only real meaningful way to get value to class members who have small value claims.

THE COURT: All right. Let me do this. There, I think, are really six screens with plaintiffs' counsel. So let me give each of you an opportunity to add on to that or say whatever you want to. And that way, I can make sure I've heard everyone.

I think, kind of going in order, Mr. Aylstock or Mr. Richards, you'd be next.

MR. AYLSTOCK: Thank you, Your Honor. Brian Aylstock for the plaintiff class.

To touch on that last question you just asked, having spent my career litigating against Johnson \& Johnson and other
large corporations, I can't imagine a lawyer that was -- be able to take a case and even attempt to litigate. This is really, as Ms. Grombacher said, the only -- the class vehicle is the only means for recovery. And certainly, understand that people can have different views about the class vehicle and whether it's right or wrong, and it seems to me that's a question for the legislative bodies. If they choose to deal with it as opposed to the Court's, you know, making some policy decision as to whether that's right or wrong.

But the fact of the matter is, but for the class vehicle, it would make no economic sense for any lawyer to every take that claim, and for an individual to try to do it on their own. Again, time is money. We're talking about lots of time for very little recovery.

As for the voucher program, you know, those are transferrable. It's certainly something that is, I think, meaningful, as reflected by the number of claimants who applied for it. And, in fact, I think they will get real value for it. And, again, these are products that simply, after our investigation, as confirmed by the discovery, were not affected products. So that's, to me, a windfall. And I don't know how we could do any better than that.

And so I echo what Ms. Grombacher said. But I certainly think this is a fair and reasonable settlement, and added tremendous value. And the alternative for, you know,
litigating for years and years was only going to delay the implementation of these very important safeguards that are now protected by this agreement. And if it's approved by the class settlement itself. And those, you know, protections are meaningful. And so we're proud of this settlement, and we'd ask Your Honor to let it go forward.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
Ms. Walsh, how about I go to you next.
MS. WALSH: Thank you very much, Your Honor. I really don't have much to add beyond what $I$ think is very well laid out in the briefs and as sort of underscored by Ms. Grombacher and Mr. Aylstock. You know, I would just, as point of emphasis, Mr. Aylstock's final point regarding the, you know, speed with which we were able to get agreement that put safeguards in place so that this doesn't happen again, you know, in addition to the value of these vouchers, I think that, you know, for the plaintiffs, you know, that I've spoken with and just, you know, given the issues that arose here, those have tremendous value, and I think very well warrants the approval of this very reasonable settlement.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Walsh.
Mr. Rumberger, let me go to you.
MR. RUMBERGER: Thank you, Your Honor. I've been on the periphery of this. I filed one of the earlier cases. But I appreciate just the opportunity to have -- participate by
listening.

I think the settlement is fair and reasonable. Plaintiff's counsel always want more, or want more of a result. But I would echo it. We've heard from counsel already. And maybe add just that the class vehicle really is the only legislative tool available to hold the makers of defective products accountable. And I think that's one of the reasons that we have that.

I'm familiar with the arguments of Ted Frank, and I think they really do go more to policy, and not the specifics of this particular resolution and settlement, as has been pointed out in the briefs. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Rumberger. Mr. Dravillas, I'm going to go to you next. And I apologize if I mispronounced your last name.

MR. DRAVILLAS: It's fine, Your Honor.
Ms. Walsh really chimed in with the only thing that I would add, which is the alacrity with which this case has been resolved really serves as benefit to the class. You see these cases drag on for years and years, especially in the consumer context, and it's really remarkable that in what's essentially just a year, you have class members who not only get a monetary value, but injunctive relief. And that's really great, I think.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. And then how about

Mr. Byrne?
MR. BYRNE: Thank you, Your Honor. Well, my colleagues have done a wonderful job of covering the important points of this settlement.

Again, like my colleagues, I have to say that this is a remarkable result that was produced, yes, in a very short period of time. These MDLs tend to keep a lot of attorneys employed for a lot of years, and a lot of deserving class members on the sidelines waiting for relief that sometimes they don't see for decades. Class members pass away. Class members really over time seem to lose a little faith in the overall process. And I think this settlement helps to restore people's faith in the system.

Everyone got together, worked through the facts, came up with a discovery plan that would help suss out whether everyone was addressing this problem right on the factory floor. And this settlement produced a workable injunctive relief plan that $I$ think allows all of us to ensure class members that this problem is not going to come up again. The feed stocks that were contaminated have been addressed. They are subject to ongoing testing. They weren't necessarily tested in the past. And I hope that will give everyone comfort when they use these products in the future. And I hope they'll be able to look to this class as the reason for the assurance they have, that it's safe and effective for their use.

THE COURT: Mr. Byrne, let me ask you this. MR. BYRNE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Just last week, the Eleventh Circuit decided not to reconsider the Johnson case en banc. I know you may have all been waiting for that a little bit. So I guess the timing of this hearing is actually pretty good in terms of that.

That case is interesting because -- obviously, the circuits are different. But the Eleventh Circuit seems to indicate that incentive awards for plaintiffs are not appropriate. The cases I've dealt with, incentive awards are typically around $\$ 10,000$ a plaintiff. In this case, I think there's 12 plaintiffs with a proposed incentive award of $\$ 250$ each. And frankly, we'll talk about this a little more. But it's also a unique case for me because $I$, frankly, never had a class action type case in my years as a lawyer and as a judge with such low incentive fees and such a low request for lawyer's fees.

So could you touch upon those two issues a little bit before I move over to the defense side?

MR. BYRNE: Sure. Absolutely. Well, obviously, as Your Honor knows, incentive awards are an important part of the Rule 23 construct. You know, when you have named plaintiffs who step in and carry the load for the rest of the class, their effort needs to be recognized. It
needs to be rewarded in some way. Certainly, not in a way that, you know, is -- I wouldn't call it over the top, but here, $I$ think, the low incentive award really boils down to the fact that the named class members didn't have to carry as much water of the thing as they normally would. And the attorneys for that matter didn't have to carry as much water as they normally would. We were certainly prepared to. But as my colleague said, you know, once you've obtained all of the relief you can, gosh, you know, it's time to stop, get the deal down on paper, and quit spending up hours just for self-serving reasons, you know. And I think that's what we've got here. But it is a low incentive award. I agree with Your Honor. This certainly is the fastest resolution of any class case that I've ever been involved in. And it's all the lowest fee request I've ever seen. But again, I think those two things go hand in hand.

MR. AYLSTOCK: Your Honor, this is Bryan Aylstock. THE COURT: Yes, sir. Sorry. MR. AYLSTOCK: I just wanted to point out that $I$ was with -- actually, I think it's Mr. Dravillas' partner, Ashley Keller, yesterday, in Federal Court here in Pensacola in the 3 M MDL, and we're talking about the Eleventh Circuit decision. And my understanding is that he had intended to appeal that to the Supreme Court -- ask for a writ, rather, to the Supreme Court. So I'm not necessarily sure that the issue is full and
final yet, but, hopefully, the Supreme Court will take it and reconsider, because $I$ do think that it is important that people who work hard for -- on behalf of the class and receive something to incentivize them to do so. Obviously, right now, the Eleventh Circuit disagrees with me.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. AYLSTOCK: And I respect their decision unless and until it's overturned.

THE COURT: I appreciate your bringing that up. I mean, certainly, it wasn't an across the board unanimous denial of a rehearing. I think it was seven to four. I haven't really looked at the numbers in that. But, certainly, there is some disagreement on that issue. I think you're right there.

So now, let me go to defense counsel. Before I do that, Mr. Byrne, you know, the comments you made kind of reminded me of something we all talked about at one of the hearings, I had brought up that, as a long-time criminal defense lawyer who had handled capital crimes, we're all taught as litigators to not trust each other, and to fight; and sometimes you don't recognize when you're winning, and you keep fighting. And so I think that this case is a bit unusual in many respects. And I think you're right. The -- many parts of it go hand in hand. And so that's kind of where we are.

So, Mr. Zalesin, if I could go over to you and definitely make whatever presentation you want. But if you
could also address your view of the nonmonetary portion, because I think you may be in the best position to educate me on that.

MR. ZALESIN: I'm happy to do that. Thank you very much, Your Honor. And if I may begin by just correcting one statement that the Court made at the outset.

THE COURT: Please.
MR. ZALESIN: I think you may have characterized the products at issue here as carcinogenic aerosol sunscreens.

THE COURT: I did. I always try to take 100 words and boil them down into 10. And so those 90 words that are missing probably would have been better adjectives for you.

So why don't you go ahead and tell me what you want to say.

MR. ZALESIN: Just on that issue, and on behalf of my clients, so the record is clear, as always. Johnson \& Johnson Consumer, Inc. has said many times and strongly believes that the products which were found to be contaminated with low level of benzene in them, these aerosol sunscreens, did not pose a risk of any significant or serious health or adverse events for people who use them. They were clearly out of spec and should not have had the amount of benzene in them that they did. A root cause investigation was quickly performed. The cause was isolated and identified. And Johnson \& Johnson Consumer took corrective action in recalling those products from the
marketplace, announcing that very thoroughly in the month of July, and then voluntarily offering refunds to all the consumers who had purchased those products and were instructed to discard them.

So while they were certainly products we did not encourage people do use, we, in fact, told people to stop using them. They were not carcinogenic or otherwise harmful.

On the other issue, Your Honor, in terms of just nitpicking your summary, the 80 -- just so we're clear, the $\$ 80$ million value of, $I$ think you described it as the noninjunctive, or, rather, the nonmonetary or injunctive type relief. That number, it's probably more like 70 million, if you want to segregate out the value of the refunds that were set. So the 9.8 or 9.9 million, roughly 10 million in refund checks that were issued by Johnson \& Johnson Consumer, are included within that 80 million.

And what that number effectively represents is the cost to Johnson \& Johnson Consumer to do all of the things that it has done to remediate the problem that was identified by Valisure back in May of last year; the investigation, the testing, the refund program, the destruction of inventory. You know, Johnson \& Johnson had a lot of goods on hand that were still in its possession or in its retail distribution pipeline that had to be discarded. It had to recall not only from consumers, but from retailers and distributors, goods that were
out there in the retail chain ready to be sold. And in some cases, our customers, our major retailers, said we don't want to be responsible for discarding these or removing these from our shelves. We want you to do that and bear that cost. And we did.

So when you add up all of the various things that were done to make sure that these products were not in the market as -- following the recall, to make sure that we knew exactly what the problem was, how it had happened, and how we could prevent it from ever happening again, and to implement all of those programs, and to refund consumers their money, which, by the way, the cost of that was not just the checks, but there was an enormous infrastructure created around that to get that money out to consumers and to handle those claims in an efficient way. And so when you bundle all that together, we're talking about roughly $\$ 80$ million in hard costs to Johnson \& Johnson, which we believe is a fair measure. It may be, perhaps, not a perfect economic model, but it's a fair way of thinking about the value of the relief that has been obtained by the class. And that is not including the 1.75 million in vouchers for these unaffected products.

Now, in terms of the settlement itself, your Honor, I think it's important to keep in mind the big picture here, that we have now, following preliminary approval and following the notice program that was carried out under the Court's
direction, we have more than 175,000 validated claims by households throughout the United States, which is a very healthy claims rate. And as Your Honor knows, in the notice, consumers were notified that they had the right to opt out or exclude themselves from the class. And we had two people do that. Out of all of the probably millions of purchasers and hundreds of thousands of claimants, we had exactly two opt-outs. We don't know exactly the reasons why. And we have one objection that $I$ guess we're going to deal with shortly, but Your Honor knows and is familiar with the subject matter of that objection.

I also think it bears repeating what Ms. Grombacher alluded to earlier, which was that, you know, at the outset of this, because perhaps it was done as quickly as it was and came as something of a surprise to some of the plaintiffs' lawyers who had filed complaints, but were not privy to the original settlement negotiations, that there was skepticism, and I would say, healthy skepticism, expressed by some other counsel about whether the settlement was approved. Settlement, how it had been arrived at, whether there representations that Johnson \& Johnson Consumer had made during the mediation and ensuing negotiations could be validated, which they were during discovery, both -- rather, documentation and deposition discovery.

And so following that process and having made the
discovery record available to all counsel, whether they were part of the settlement group or not, no one in that sphere has raised any concern, and everyone is supportive of the settlement. And I think, you know, as Your Honor says, we are, as lawyers and advocates, trained to be skeptics and, you know, to fight. And I think the fact that having seen all the evidence, that no one on that side of the case has any interest in opposing this settlement; in fact, as far as supportive of it, is an important thing for the Court to consider.

Mr. Aylstock said at one point that he's very proud of this settlement, and I want to echo that sentiment. I'm proud of this settlement. I think Johnson \& Johnson Consumer is proud of it. I think we've accomplished a lot by working together with plaintiffs' counsel from the outset in this case. We brought fast, efficient, and low cost relief to the plaintiff class, which is an exception to the rule that we tend to see in these types of cases, especially once a whole bunch of them get filed, and we have an MDL, they tend to take on a life of their own and they could go on for a very long time, but very high cost to the parties, ultimately, to the class, which has to fund a portion of, you know, a part of their recovery winds up going to the lawyers who spent years accumulating legal fees. And obviously, at high cost to the judiciary, which, you know, all of it has to preside over many contentious battles, be they discovery or motion practice or
what have you. And none of that has happened here because of the cooperation that, you know, took place between the parties from the outset.

And the reason, Your Honor, I think that cooperation and that rapid outcome was attainable is because Johnson \& Johnson Consumer, you know, really acted in an exemplary fashion from the outset of this, before any -- you know, it wasn't just the Neutrogena and Aveeno sunscreens that were found to have benzene contamination in these aerosol products, there were multiple products from many different manufacturers. But no one got out ahead of the issue as quickly as Johnson \& Johnson Consumer did. No one undertook a recall with the speed and efficiency that JJCI did. No one instituted a refund program like we did, or paid out the kinds of claims and numbers we did, as quickly as we did.

So you know, as I think a number of the plaintiffs' counsel have said, there really wasn't much left for them to accomplish, and, yet, they did. They did accomplish a number of things. We are extending vouchers to consumers who purchased the nonaerosol products that were included in the complaint. These are lotion-type products that did not have benzene contamination in them. Because they don't contain any -- because they're not aerosols, they don't contain a propellent, such as isobutane, which was determined to be the cause of the contamination. Nevertheless, we recognize that
some consumers, when the news first broke about this potential contamination in a variety of sunscreens, including ours, may have had concerns about using those products, may have discarded them unnecessarily. But it may have happened. And we're comfortable compensating them in the way that we have compensated them.

The vouchers are not coupons, in the sense that they certainly do not require customers to go out and repurchase the same products that they potentially have concerns about now, or might have had concerns, although those products were unaffected. They can buy with those vouchers, which the overwhelming majority of claimants will receive two vouchers, the value of which will be roughly $\$ 10$, $\$ 9$ and 90 some odd cents.

There are hundreds if not thousands of Neutrogena and Aveeno products that people can use those vouchers to obtain, and the vouchers are transferrable. So if they want to sell them to a friend, they can do that, as well. So those have real cash value, they're not just coupons that are a way of drumming up additional business for Johnson \& Johnson Consumer.

And as has been said through the settlement agreement, we have undertaken to carry out a variety of corrective actions, which are, by now, enforceable promises by contract and with the imprimatur of the Court, once final approval is granted. These corrective actions include specifications,
testing specifications, and benzene level testing that is well in excess of what the FDA would require this industry leading. They require testing of finished goods, and they require a variety of other steps to ensure the safety of the products going forward, which we are happy to do, but which can't be denied have value to consumers who purchase our products going forward.

And one of the things I thought was interesting in the paper back and forth with Mr. Frank's objection was, you know, the assertion by Mr. Frank that the consumers who bought the products and are members of the class are not the beneficiaries of the settlement because, you know, they are past purchasers, and their settlement can only benefit future purchasers in terms of the nonmonetary relief.

But as I think the plaintiffs appropriately pointed out in response, we're not talking here about a one-time purchase, or even something you buy for a limited period of time, like baby formula or diapers, until your kids move on to another stage of life. This is sunscreen. And if people are being healthy and wise, they use it, you know, on their kids from the time they're infants until, you know, throughout their entire lives. And so there's, I think, likely to be if not 100 percent, near 100 percent overlap between the past purchasers of these products and sunscreen users of the future, and there should be, and that's a good thing.

So at bottom, Your Honor, I think this settlement brings relief to the class. It brings finality. It brings efficiency. And it removes the risks, uncertainties, and delays of at litigation would entail, had the settlement not come to fruition at the time that it did.

We have defenses that we might have raised against consumers, had we been unable to settle. I don't think it would have been easy, if possible at all, for any individual purchaser to show that their particular unit product was contaminated with benzene, and nevertheless, everyone is treated the same under this settlement. That would have raised Article III standing issues, it would have raised, certainly, class certification issues. And all of those issues are resolved and don't need to be litigated. And those risks don't need to be faced by the class because of this settlement.

And so, to my mind, this is the type of settlement the Court should not only approve, but encourage, and the consumer advocates should embrace. And I wish every case went as smoothly as this did, and accomplished as much in as little time, and at such a low cost.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Zalesin.
Mr. Berman, anything that you wanted to add?
MR. BERMAN: Nothing, Your Honor, other than to say that this really is, in my experience, anyway, an
extraordinarily unique case. And such a rapid settlement, as everyone has said. And is really, in my experience, it stands entirely alone.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Berman.
Any other lawyers, plaintiffs' or defense counsel, that I haven't heard from that need to make an appearance that want to be heard?

MS. GROMBACHER: Your Honor, you heard from me. I would just ask that $I$ have an opportunity to respond to the objector's counsel once he makes --

THE COURT: Oh, of course. Of course. Sure. We've got a good amount of time set aside, and we're consistent with how the case has gone. We've moving along fairly quickly, so no worries. I absolutely want to make sure everyone's heard.

So we do have one objector, and that's Theodore H. Frank, or Ted Frank. And he is represented today by Mr. Andren.

So, Mr. Andren, how about you take it away at this point. And I would say that whether we agree with what the filings say or not, the quality of the filings all around, including Mr. Andren, your documents and Mr. Frank's documents, are just really excellent. And I appreciate the arguments very much. I think that that's what good lawyering is all about. You know, ultimately, I'm going to make a decision, and someone's going to be happy and someone isn't, or maybe
nobody's going to be happy. As you know, it's never that everyone's happy. And then, of course, there's recourse after that.

But, Mr. Andren, I would like to hear from you, and then I have a few questions for you, as well.

MR. ANDREN: Excellent, Your Honor, thank you.
I just want to start by maybe trying to address some of the points you raised at the beginning regarding the 9 million and the refund.

I think the cases for Your Honor to look at for that is Koby v. ARS National Services, 846 Fd. 3 at 1080. And then, also -- that's a Ninth Circuit case. And then, Reynolds v. Benefits National Bank, 288 Fd. 3 at 277.

Reynolds says the injunction issued during settlement negotiations don't bear on the final validity and could not count -- could not be credited towards the settlement agreement. In the Koby case, they discuss the -- it must be a consideration. Whatever is given in the settlement must be a consideration for the release in claims. And I think it's a very easy answer here when you look at it. If Your Honor was to reject this settlement, all the class members have the refund and the recall provisions, whether the settlement's approved or not. So it doesn't serve as any consideration towards the release of their claims. So we would say that's a pretty straightforward proposition.

The 70 million, 80 million, 70 million nonmonetary relief. Mr. Zalesin just sat there and told you J\&J was going to do this no matter what. They said they did this in response to the Valisure petition to the FDA. The plaintiffs' own filing said J\&J was not aware of the presence of the benzene. They did an internal investigation. The FDA did an investigation. To think that Johnson \& Johnson, I mean, they've already said, did that in response to that. But to think they would not do that, especially with what they're facing with the talcum powder litigation and a fear of any other litigation here, with the FDA looking over their shoulder, we're going to just not withdraw the products, not offer the refund, but do anything to hurt their brand. It justifies common sense. And the plaintiffs have not offered any sort of record evidence that shows that they should be credited with that $\$ 70$ million. Which, again, is measured as the cost to J\&J to go through those actions. Again, the cost of the defendant is not the benefit to the class; and that is what's important here, the benefit to the class.

I'm sorry. I do want to say one other portion here.
You had remarked that you weren't familiar with such a low fee request here. I would point out to the Court that the $\$ 2.6$ million fee request here, $I$ point out to the Court, that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bluetooth, the fee request was \$1 million. In Seventh Circuit's decision in the Subway

Footlong litigation, the fee request was $\$ 500,000$.
So there really isn't anything uniquely low about this, you know, in absolute terms, in the $\$ 2.6$ million amount they're requesting. But that's kind of besides the point anyway, because the real question is what are they asking for in relation to what the class is receiving. And that here is $\$ 2.6$ million in cash to the plaintiffs' lawyer, and \$1.75 million, at best, in coupons to the class, with 97 percent of the class receiving nothing.

And that's all you need to know. That is, at the very best scenario, over 50 percent of the funds J\&J was willing to pay to settle this litigation. And if they get a poor redemption rate on those coupons, then we're talking in excess of 90 percent of the amount of the settlement that J\&J was willing to bring to the table, and is going to the class counsel, as opposed to the class. And I think plaintiffs in their papers, and I think they said again here today, well, you know, you go to look, these claims were so weak, they weren't actually harmed, and a lot of other things. But again, that doesn't matter. That is a question about what the amount of the settlement should have been. We are not objecting on those grounds. I'm not here to tell you the plaintiffs needed to get 40 million, or they needed to get 4 million, or they needed to get 20 million. It doesn't matter. They settled for an amount, and they get a fair percentage of that amount, as
calculated as what the class receives.
And here, the best estimates for what the class is going to receive is $\$ 1.75$ million in coupons. Again, under CAFA, and we can go into this later, if you want, but I think you called them coupons, and they certainly -- I think it's obvious under any calculation, at least, these are coupons, but the redemption rate is almost certain not going to be \$1.75 million. So that's another big issue here.

THE COURT: Mr. Andren, let me ask you this. If I were to, consistent with your argument, put the $\$ 70$ million of nonmonetary relief aside, consider only the $\$ 1.75$ million coupon number that we're talking about, add to that the approximate $\$ 9.8$ million of the actual monetary relief that $I$ know you're saying I shouldn't consider. But let's say I did that. Then based on your understanding of Eleventh Circuit case law and CAFA, would you then agree that $\$ 2.6$ million for the plaintiffs' attorneys to recover in fees and costs in reasonable?

MR. ANDREN: Well, it's certainly not the case here. But $I$ would think something in that range could be. But not here. Again, like I've said, the $\$ 9$ million is simply just as illusory as the $\$ 70$ million here.

THE COURT: So that's what $I$ really want to talk about, is why you think that's illusory. I've looked at the cases. I've looked at the cases in -- I think Mr. Frank cited the Aqua

Dots case. Obviously, very well-written. It's Judge Easterbrook. Everything he writes is well-written. So I enjoyed reading that.

That case, though, really dealt with the class certification time period, not the settlement time period, where we are, number one. And number two, although the dates aren't really laid out in the Seventh Circuit opinion, I get a different idea when $I$ read that case in the sense that there it seemed clear the recall was happening, whereas, here you have the May 25, 2021, date, which is the Valisure action and the Serota complaint. Then you have another complaint that comes the next day. The recall is not until July 14th of 2021.

MR. ANDREN: Mmm-hmm.
THE COURT: How do I just say, hey, the recall has nothing to do with the filing of the complaints, and the negotiations that began that very day, because that came up at a prior hearing, that the negotiations were -- began the -shortly after the complaint was filed?

MR. ANDREN: I would first just say, that's a bit of a red flag, too. I mean, if you file a complaint on the same day you said let's talk substantive settlements, that doesn't look like somebody trying to litigate on behalf of the class, that looks like somebody looking to settle as quickly as possible. And I believe the Valisure did make -- and I could be wrong with this, but $I$ believe it was the day before the
complaint was filed that they actually announced what they had found. They did, in fact, I think, file the next day, which is also when you get the Serota complaint here.

THE COURT: I think that's accurate.
MR. ANDREN: But the larger part, I did make this point, and I want to make it again, is if you don't approve this settlement, that relief already is had by the class of everything there. It's not a consideration for the settlement that was reached in December. And Koby says it must be -there must be consideration for the release of claims. And Koby's great. Even if they're really weak claims, even if they're not worth much, even if any of that, it still matters that they're worth something. And like we all were talking about here, the class action process is the way that we can do a lot of this, and that's their value. And we need to protect that value for them so that they can pursue valid actions, if that's what they're going to do.

But at the end of the day, the refund already exists, it's already come and gone. It's not consideration for the relief. It's not a benefit to the class. Because they have it no matter what happens to the settlement.

THE COURT: So let me absolutely read the Koby case. I mean, it's important, and you've cited to it.

MR. ANDREN: Mmm-hmm.
THE COURT: I don't know what the context of it is now,
obviously, because I'd have to take a look at it. But --
MR. ANDREN: They're --
THE COURT: I was just going to ask, are the judges on that case, are they actually with a straight face saying that the day the settlement negotiation -- the day the settlement agreement's signed is the date that counts, but all those months of negotiating, where things are done, that doesn't count? I mean, that just seems so foreign to common sense to me.

MR. ANDREN: Yes. I think you had a slightly longer period of time between the injunction there. And there were some other issues, that the injunction wasn't worth a whole heap of a lot either, which I'd say it's not here. But nonetheless, I think I want to -- I mean, think about the common sense. And this is the same as we talked about with the \$70 million.

Do you really think that J\&J was not going to recall these products and offer refunds? I mean, they announced it. Their announcement -- and it's in the record, it's in our filing -- was J\&J, or, you know, Johnson \& Johnson offers voluntary recall and refund. They put up their number; give us a call, we'll give you a refund. There's no end date, there's nothing. Of course, they sit down and say we will, you know -they gotta put something in the settlement, and so, you know, let's build this value up, let's do what we can so we can
justify our fees. That's just how this process goes.
THE COURT: Are there any suntan lotion aerosols from any manufacturer still on the market?

MR. ANDREN: Yeah, I believe so.
THE COURT: So then how does that argument you make make any sense?

MR. ANDREN: Well, because they're [audio distortion], at least, for their own brand value. I mean, they've already -- they stated they announced a voluntary recall. I don't want to put words in his mouth, but I'm pretty sure Mr. Zalesin sat there and said they were happy to do these things, and they were going to do these things. Then he said, but, oh, by the way, they also benefit the class.

But to say Johnson \& Johnson is probably suffering, I mean, I think any company would have done it. But Johnson \& Johnson is suffering with brand image issues with the talcum powder and some other issues, like. They're going to do what's best for their brand, and that's going to be to offer the consumer the comfort of saying, you know, here's an issue, we don't think it's an issue, but, you know what, we're going to take everything off, and we're going to give you a refund of your money back, because we're a good company, and we want to make you feel good about doing this.

THE COURT: Sure. I hear what you're saying there. But there's also the fact that on May 25th, the lawsuit was
filed here. And certainly, Mr. Zalesin has got to align in terms of what he's saying, just like how he corrected my preamble. And, you know, that's his job.

But my thought is, on these other companies that still are manufacturing and selling aerosol suntans that haven't pulled it, I'm assuming there's no lawsuit filed against them.

MR. ANDREN: Right. But, I mean, but they don't have their name in the paper, and I think that's what's driving their behavior more than anything else.

THE COURT: All right. So how could this settlement be better?

MR. ANDREN: Give the class more money. That would basically be the best way. I mean, cash would be better than a coupon. But certainly, something worth more than $\$ 5$ would be worth more. There's a lot of ways. Again, it's not about the size that we're objecting to, it's about the proportion. It's about the distribution. It's about the allocation.

THE COURT: Understood. And then let me ask you this: Let's say that the parties litigated this case, took extensive discovery, depositions, set it for trial, traveled here for hearings, you know, did all of this, and now we're in 2025. And then, on the eve of trial, they resolve the case, and the resolution is just the same as it is today.

Under the CAFA rules, under the contingency fee model, under the law in the Eleventh Circuit, your argument would be
that they would still be entitled three years from now, after all of that work, to the same fee that you're arguing for today, correct?

MR. ANDREN: Yes, correct. And that's Rule 23, and that's CAFA. You are paid for results. You're not paid for, you know, all the hard work.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ANDREN: But hopefully, it's commensurate. You know, there are -- in certain instances, there could be multipliers. There can be other things that can be awarded.

THE COURT: Maybe we should create a new lodestar which says the quicker a case is resolved, then there's a multiplier.

MR. ANDREN: No, I'm not suggesting that, no. But it is odd when you have -- the settlement was reached quickly. There was, again, no motions practice. I mean, those aren't necessarily good things. Efficiency is good, but there needs to be --

THE COURT: Listen, I understand what you're saying. I hear it. I go back to criminal cases a lot because that's really my wheelhouse in terms of how $I$ grew up as a lawyer. You know, I handled numerous capital cases. And I remember one particular defendant, a co-defendant on a case of mine, who was offered, instead of a first-degree murder charge where he was facing the death penalty, because they felt he would be a great witness, they offered a plea to manslaughter where he would
actually be released on probation. And, of course, as many criminal defendants would, his thought was, gee, that plea came so fast, they must have no case on me. So he rejects the plea. And that was 21 years ago. And he's done 21 years of his sentence at this point. And he's going to serve his sentence throughout his whole life.

So it's interesting how we make these decisions. And sometimes we look at something that happens quickly as good and sometimes as bad. But I mean, as lawyers, this is what we do. We try to kind of pick at each issue and understand the law and the policy of it. For me, this is very educational, so I appreciate it.

Let me do this then, Mr. Andren. I am not sure you had concluded what you wanted to say. So let me make sure you get to say whatever else you want to say, and then I'm going to give the lawyers a response, and then I'll give you one more time, last word.

MR. ANDREN: Okay, great. I just have two other quick moments before all the rebuttal and everything. I just want to cover the CAFA settlement question.

Of course, we think this is a coupon settlement. The Eleventh Circuit has not articulated a test or specifically adopted any test. And CAFA does not defined coupon. We think the best course of action here is for the Court to do what we do in terms of define, and use of plain meaning; and we think
under any plain meaning a $\$ 5$ coupon good towards the purchase of a Neutrogena or Aveeno product is plainly a coupon. But if you are interested in applying something like the Ninth Circuit's multifactor test in cases such as Online DVD and McKinney-Drobnis, then we still have a coupon.

Those factors being whether the class members need to spend more of their own money. Again, \$5. I submitted a declaration with our objection, that's Exhibit 2. \$5, I think there was -- I could be wrong -- I think something like six products that you could buy with that. So it's almost certain that the class members would have to spend more of their own money if they were going to take advantage of the coupon. So that's factor one, we failed.

The second would be whether it's good for a small set of products. Here, Neutrogena, Aveeno, these are all skin care sunscreen products. If you look at the McKinney-Drobnis case, I believe there there's something like 231 different products of creams and lotions and things that Massage Envy sold, that the Court said, yeah, that's not sufficient. That's not, like, everything under the sun that Walmart.com has, Online DVD. So again, we fail that one.

And then lastly, is the flexibility and things like the expiration dates, whether they -- the flexibility of the coupons, whether they expire. Here, they expire after a year. So clearly, we're not in some sort of cash equivalent
situation. We're at a coupon. But whether we have a CAFA coupon or not a CAFA coupon, Rule $23(e)(2)(C)$ is still what applies, and none of those issues are ameliorated by arm's length negotiations, which they've said several times. I think that's an important point. Is that an arm's length negotiation process, that is a requirement of Rule $23(\mathrm{e})(2)(\mathrm{B})$. We are here with the self-dealing issues. Those derive from Rule $22(e)(2)(C)$, and I think that, certainly, the Court would be, like we mentioned, the Briseno v. Henderson case under the Ninth Circuit, would be very enlightening to Your Honor. I'll wait, and allow my colleagues to speak. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Andren. Ms. Grombacher, let me go back to you. MS. GROMBACHER: Sure. So a couple of issues here. A lot of it, if we spar back and forth, it's really just a recitation of the papers, which $I$ know Your Honor has read. So I can talk about the CAFA stuff, but, again, what he brought up, what we've addressed, it's all in the papers.

We disagree that this is a coupon. We think this is clearly a voucher. They are transferrable. Mr. Zalesin talked about this a little bit ago. You can transfer it. You can sell it. There is no scenario where you can't buy a product in whole where you would have to put your own money in. There are products that are under the voucher amount, even if you just receive just one voucher of which there are very few class
members who will do that. And that it's not just for sunscreen, it's for shave gels, it's for face masks, it's for cleansing towelettes. I mean, there's a number of products you can purchase.

So there's no scenario where a class member is forced into patronage. They can get something for free. They will not have to put any money in.

But I think, ultimately, what we need to go back to is should you cast aside this settlement. I guess the two Achilles heels really are the vouchers, which are -- I think establish for products that have very little value, had this case ever gone to trial. Because as Mr. Zalesin talked about, this is an isobutane issue. This is not a Neutrogena issue, this was an isobutane supplier issue. And it infected a number of manufacturers. And it happened to products that require propellent. To the lotion products that don't, there's not contamination. And we tested. We had an independent lab test. And we looked at Neutrogena, and they did testing on testing. The product simply doesn't contain benzene. We would not have been able, likely, to prevail on this at trial.

So that claim has little to no value. And yet, they got a real value, a real benefit, nonetheless. And yet, Mr. Frank, as a consumer advocate, is saying that we've done something wrong there, by getting a value for a claim that had essentially no merit. He's also saying that you can wash this
aside because we negotiated for a benefit, and they're going to get it, regardless of whether you sign this or not in terms of the objective. It's kind of this curious argument where I guess the parties should have waited to implement the injunctive relief, even though all the class members who I spoke with, and I talked to probably more than 100 myself, asked the same question: Is the product safe? Can I use the product? Can I put the product on my child?

And I did talk to one of the individuals who chose to exclude herself. And she didn't have a problem with the settlement. She just was worried that there might be some harm to her, personal injury harm, and she wanted to create a record that she didn't ever participated in any kind of JJCI settlement related to this product, even though she understood that she wouldn't be releasing our clients. I can't speak to the other exclusion, but $I$ know for the one woman.

You know, that's kind of a curious argument to make, that we shouldn't have put this in place, we should have waited for the Court's order, because now you can just cast aside this settlement, and give the benefit to the class, and just do away with the parties' contractual agreement.

You know, from the outside looking in, it's easy to say JJCI would have done this, or the FDA made them do that. And he brings up talc, and talc is a good example. And my colleagues on the plaintiffs' side can talk to that, because we

1 -- they have a lot of talc cases. I think Johnson \& Johnson just stopped selling talc. And it's moved to the cornstarch-based product. Even though they've been embroiled in litigation for years, and it's been a high profile litigation.

So what a company will or will not do, and what their tolerance is, is hard to say. And even with this company, who has acted in different ways, in different capacities. But they surely did the right thing here. And it was the result of negotiation. The testing protocols were negotiated. They were contested. The levels were contested. They were highly disputed. We talked to toxicologists. We talked to chemists. We sought the advice of independent third-party labs on testing. We talked to people in cosmetic regulation people, and quality control who worked in these fields, to design a system that would work. And that was not the FDA. That was us.

So even if you take the value of the settlement, the big 80,000, you cut it, you give us 10 percent of that, we're still going to get to a number that even the objector would say is reasonable on his papers, if you really read it.

The objection is curious, given how important this litigation was, and the potential for harm. Now, there may not be carcinogenic products, but this benzene is a carcinogen. And to have it in a product -- and we can talk about whether

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it's harmful or not. But to have it in a product at all, it's something the consumers certainly don't want, and something that we wanted to ensure got out of the product and that we ensure that it didn't get back in there, that there were protocols in place.

And every class member I talked to, that was important to them. And I don't know how many class members the objector or his counsel spoke with. But, you know, I can personally say I talked to over a hundred. And that was the refrain, that was the question. Can I use this product? What sunscreen do I use? How did they fix it? Are they going to fix it? How do I have comfort that I can use the product?

And so that benefit is not illusory, and it was highly contested, and it was negotiated. I'll let, you know, maybe some of the other plaintiffs' counsel weigh in briefly if they want to on that point, but that's simply what $I$ would say about that.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Grombacher. Ms. Walsh?
MS. WALSH: Your Honor, I would just underscore a point that Ms. Grombacher made which I think is very important.

As I understand it, what objector's counsel is asking the Court to do is to make a decision based on speculation about what the world might have looked like in the absence of all the efforts of class counsel. And you know, what we would ask and submit is correct, is Your Honor to make a decision
based on the facts in the world as they exist, which include all of the efforts of class counsel, which have been led very ably by Ms. Grombacher, and the protections that now are in place as a result of those efforts. And I can personally attest that $I$ had many of those same conversations, not just with named plaintiffs, but, you know, people in my life, what sunscreen am I supposed to use, is it okay to use this, and the relief that has been achieved by the hard work that was done is really meaningful to people out there in the world.

THE COURT: You know, part of my concern is that if $I$ were to undo the settlement under the theory that these individuals have received something, whether it's a coupon, a voucher, or a check, or some combination of that, what incentive do lawyers have to get involved in cases like this? But that may be, Mr. Andren, part of your theory is just the class action model, in and of itself, is not what you're looking for.

I guess what I'm trying to figure out is what you would think is a better solution. I think what you've told me is for the plaintiffs to get more. I don't know. In this kind of a class action, where we're not dealing with personal injury or any claims like that, how you give someone more than what they put in. And it seems like the resolution is that people are getting back what they put in. Plus, there's injunctive relief. So I'm just trying to iron that out in my mind.

But then the second argument, of course, that you made is that the attorney's fees should be -- bear some percentage relationship to the actual recovery. So we have to think of that, as well.

Before I go to you, Mr. Andren, though, any other plaintiffs' counsel that want to be heard?

Mr. Byrne?
MR. BYRNE: The only question I have, Your Honor, is this: Mr. Andren and his client have argued that this class should have gotten more. He can't really get his arms around what more looks like, what it feels like, what it sounds like, and he certainly hasn't articulated to the Court how he would go about getting one dime more for this client. He is not in the business of representing class members, and neither is his client. That's just not what he does. He has absolutely no idea how much time we spent in conference room after conference room talking about this very thing. Is there any more? Can we do better? Because all plaintiffs' counsel in this case were ready, willing, and able to go to the mattresses, so to speak, and fight as hard and for as long as it took to get everything we could.

But, you know, meeting after meeting, we just -- we all came to the considered conclusion that that's it. We've, much like your client, who received this wonderful deal, but thought, golly, you know, there must be a hook in there
somewhere. Usually, there is. Sometimes there isn't. We talked a lot about this question, and we just couldn't find the hook. And Mr. Andren can't find it either. And at the end of the day, when you talk about what makes a fair and reasonable class settlement, if you're going to come in as an objector, you have to be able to sketch out a plan for how this class gets more. Is he going to just fight harder? What's he going to take, more depositions? He's going to -- I just don't understand it.

And I would make this other point. I don't mean to go on and on. But, you know, like my colleagues, I talked to class member after class member, heard their concerns, heard their worries. What do we do? How many of this do I throw out of my house? How much can we use going forward under this proposed injunctive relief you got? Well, you know, as part of the relief, all cans of Neutrogena spray and Aveeno spray that are implicated in this settlement are now specially marked. If it doesn't have a specific marking on the can that came about as a result of this settlement, you need to throw it away. You need to throw it away.

And that's relief that we didn't need to wait on for ten years. We waited, as class counsel, to be able to tell class members right now, this is safe, this isn't safe. We didn't want them to guess.

And yes, it's true, Johnson \& Johnson had an incentive,

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I think, to be able to tell the public that, look, this is
safe, this isn't safe. You trusted Neutrogena in the past.
We've solved this problem. You can trust it going forward.
And here's what you need to look at when you go in the store to
assure yourself that you've got a safe product. All of that
came about as a result of this settlement.
    I have no idea what Mr. Andren or his client think they
would do to produce better relief.
    Anyway, I apologize for going on and on, Your Honor.
But it just -- I think it's a point that needs to be made.
    THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Byrne.
    Mr. Aylstock, I saw you unmuted and then you went back
on mute. Was there anything you wanted to add?
    MR. AYLSTOCK: Not after Ms. Grombacher and Ms. Walsh.
I think they put it well.
    THE COURT: Thank you.
    Mr. Dravillas, anything?
    MR. DRAVILLAS: No, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Mr. Rumberger, anything?
    MR. RUMBERGER: No, Your Honor. Thank you very much.
        THE COURT: Thank you.
        Mr. Zalesin, back to you, then. Anything that you
wanted to add?
    MR. ZALESIN: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.
        I just want to point out that the sort of binary choice
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or dichotomy that Mr. Andren is asking the Court to apply to evaluate the settlement, which is what happens if you approve it on the one hand versus what happens if you don't approve it. And he's saying that a lot of the things that came about, at least in part because of this settlement, certainly, as Your Honor points out, following the filing of not just one, but multiple complaints. And we knew we were headed toward an MDL, even if it hadn't been sent to Your Honor yet. Yeah, I think it would be a very, very heavy precedent to set to indicate that that's the model that a Court should use. You know, what's the before and after approval, and not look at anything else.

Let me give you one very concrete example of why I think that's wrong. Yeah, sunscreen, it turns out, is kind of a seasonal product, although in your part of the world, there's sun year-round. In my part of the world, there isn't. And people tend to buy sunscreen in the spring and use it in the summer, then put it away in the fall, unless they go on a Florida vacation.

And so there's a season for selling, and there's a season to manufacturing. And the manufacturing season turns out to be -- starts toward the very end of the year and continues into the first quarter of the year, and that's where the pipeline gets filled.

And so, you know, we were negotiating this settlement,
mediating before Judge Lifland, continuing our negotiations, hammering out a term sheet, and ultimately a final definitive agreement at the same time that the company was getting ready to ramp up its manufacturing for the next season, having identified the cause of the problem and having considered, you know, what remediation or what preventative measures would be applied. And to their credit, the plaintiffs negotiated hard.

For example, for a finished goods testing requirement that would require a certain percentage of samples from every lot to be tested for not just the ingredient, isobutane, but the finished product. And that happened, that has been happening for months. It happened throughout the last sunscreen selling season because of the settlement in this case.

And other positive things happened because of the settlement in this case, as well, such as the extension of the refund program for a full six months, and enabling people to make claims who otherwise might not have been able to make claims. And so to say that you should look at it from the date of approval, which necessarily is going to come months after the settlement itself is originally negotiated, finalized, after which court approval is sought, you know, versus what happens if you don't approve it, I don't think is a fair and appropriate lens through which to view the value of the settlement to the class. There are things that have already
benefited the class as a result of the settlement, and they should be considered along with the prospective relieve, which is obviously the continuation of the injunctive measures, but also the award of these vouchers which has real value to class members who otherwise almost certainly would have gotten nothing.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Zalesin.
Mr. Berman, anything else?
MR. BERMAN: Nothing, your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And then, Mr. Andren, back over to you, last word.

MR. ANDREN: Thanks again, Your Honor. I'm just going to try to briefly touch on the things that everyone talked about.

One, I want to address Mr. Byrne's points. I said it before, $I$ 'm going to say it again. We are not saying they should settle for more money. We are not saying -- if you want to call it 4.3 million was not enough. We're not saying they needed 40 million. We're saying, if you settled for 4 million, 4.3 million, whatever you want to call it, you don't get 2.6 million. That's what we're saying. Okay?

That point goes to, also, one of Ms. Grombacher's point when she's talking about mentioning, well, our claims are so
weak, they don't even have benzene in it. Again, that's a question about how much they should have settled for, how much the claims are worth. That's not a question about the distribution of the funds to the class to class counsel. These are the Rule $23(E)(C)(2)$ problems. Okay.

Again, you know -- again, a little bit of talking out of both sides of their mouth, too. Like, you know, if these claims are really weak, these claims are really weak. Also, we're over here helping everybody. We've got this bad stuff off the streets, and we helped everybody. But, also, that there's no benzene in this product, so there's actually not a problem. So, okay, that's interesting.

But then there's one more point about the injunctive relief. The one part per million of the raw materials versus the two part per million of the final, which is the FDA's standard. I'm pretty sure there's no record evidence that that's any safer of a product. I think the FDA knows what they're doing in having a two part per million threshold in the final product. But they certainly have not submitted any evidence that this one part per million in the raw goods is leading to a safer end product.

I mean, we don't know -- does that mean J\&J's throwing out 90 percent of their potential raw goods, are they -- is that just, like, a threshold that everybody meets? I don't know. It's not in the record. Again, this is Koby. It is
their burden to prove the value of the injunctive relief.
Your Honor, we're both sitting here speculating, well, okay, the date was this, and then that, and then the date came here. Maybe it -- well, they could have provided better record evidence to at least offer justification, which would give us some proper notice, too, to challenge that valuation of the $\$ 9$ million of any of this injunctive relief, I would say, they really haven't met their evidentiary burden on.

And, you know, again, there was a point that we're asking to speculate on the state of the world. Again, it's not speculation, it's a rule of law. We have a record that we work from, and we're talking -- we're asking the Court to evaluate, as it's required to do, evaluate the settlement based on that record. And that's the record on which we objected to it.

So unless Your Honor has any more questions, I don't have anything further.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Andren. I really appreciate all the hard work you all have put into this case and into today's hearing.

Before I close up for the afternoon, I just want to make sure, did everyone get to say what they wanted to say? Are there any points that we didn't touch on that we need to address?

I think we're all clear there.
Okay. So what I need to do is read some of the cases
that were brought up specifically in today's hearing. As I said, I've read all the papers, but I think you've pointed me to a few areas that $I$ need to read more closely.

What I always like to do is give the parties an opportunity to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, in Word, and get them over to me.

With regard to that, though, I'm not asking you to spend hours and hours reinventing the wheel. You all have already filed all of that in different forms. It may just be a question of converting what you've already filed to a Word document and cutting and pasting. I'm not trying to load you all up with more work. You have plenty to do.

But if you are able to -- today's the 12th. If you're going to submit any kind of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, if you could get them to me by the 26 th, that would be great, of August.

MR. ANDREN: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. And with that, if there's no questions, I hope you all will have nice weekends. I set this up specifically over Zoom, as you all know, several months ago when we still didn't know where we were headed in terms of COVID. But I do hope that I'll get to see you all in person at some point here in sunny Florida.

MR. AYLSTOCK: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. Take care, everyone. Be safe.

MR. ZALESIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
MS. WALSH: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Court recessed at 3:38 p.m.)

C ERTIFICATE

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    I hereby certify that the foregoing is an
accurate transcription of the proceedings in the
above-entitled matter.
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